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Abstract
In this paper, we show that Markov’s principle is not derivable in dependent type theory with
natural numbers and one universe. One tentative way to prove this would be to remark that
Markov’s principle does not hold in a sheaf model of type theory over Cantor space, since Markov’s
principle does not hold for the generic point of this model. It is however not clear how to interpret
the universe in a sheaf model [9, 17, 21]. Instead we design an extension of type theory, which
intuitively extends type theory by the addition of a generic point of Cantor space. We then show
the consistency of this extension by a normalization argument. Markov’s principle does not hold
in this extension, and it follows that it cannot be proved in type theory.
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1 Introduction
Markov’s principle has a special status in constructive mathematics. One way to formulate
this principle is that if it is impossible that a given algorithm does not terminate, then it does
terminate. It is equivalent to the fact that if a set of natural number and its complement are
both computably enumerable, then this set is decidable. This form is often used in recursivity
theory. This principle was first formulated by Markov, who called it “Leningrad’s principle”,
and founded a branch of constructive mathematics around this principle [14].
This principle is also equivalent to the fact that if a given real number is not equal to 0
then this number is apart from 0 (that is this number is < −r or > r for some rational number
r > 0). On this form, it was explicitly refuted by Brouwer in intuitionistic mathematics, who
gave an example of a real number (well defined intuitionistically) which is not equal to 0,
but also not apart from 0. (The motivation of Brouwer for this example was to show the
necessity of using negation in intuitionistic mathematics [4].) The idea of Brouwer can be
represented formally using topological models [19].
In a neutral approach to mathematics, such as Bishop’s [3], Markov’s principle is simply
left undecided. We also expect to be able to prove that Markov’s principle is not provable
in formal system in which we can express Bishop’s mathematics. For instance, Kreisel [12]
introduced modified realizability to show that Markov’s principle is not derivable in the
formal system HAω. Similarly, one would expect that Markov’s principle is not derivable in
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17:2 The Independence of Markov’s Principle in Type Theory
Martin-Löf type theory [15], but, as far as we know, such a result has not been established
yet. 1
We say that a statement A is independent of some formal system if A cannot be derived
in that system. A statement in the formal system of Martin-Löf type theory (MLTT) is
represented by a closed type. A statement/type A is derivable if it is inhabited by some term t
(written MLTT ` t :A). This is the so-called propositions-as-types principle. Correspondingly
we say that a statement A (represented as a type) is independent of MLTT if there is no
term t such that MLTT ` t :A.
The main result of this paper is to show that Markov’s principle is independent of
Martin-Löf type theory.2
The main idea for proving this independence is to follow Brouwer’s argument. We want
to extend type theory with a “generic” infinite sequence of 0 and 1 and establish that it is
both absurd that this generic sequence is never 0, but also that we cannot show that it has
to take the value 0. To add such a generic sequence is exactly like adding a Cohen real [5]
in forcing extension of set theory. A natural attempt for doing this will be to consider a
topological model of type theory (sheaf model over Cantor space), extending the work [19]
to type theory. However, while it is well understood how to represent universes in presheaf
model [9], it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to represent universes in sheaf models,
as we learnt from works of Chuangjie Xu and Martin Escardo [21] and works of Thomas
Streicher [17]. Our approach is here instead a purely syntactical description of a forcing
extension of type theory (refining previous work of [7]), which contains a formal symbol
for the generic sequence and a proof that it is absurd that this generic sequence is never 0,
together with a normalization theorem, from which we can deduce that we cannot prove
that this generic sequence has to take the value 0. Since this formal system is an extension
of type theory, the independence of Markov’s principle follows.
As stated in [11], which describes an elegant generalization of this principle in type theory,
Markov’s principle is an important technical tool for proving termination of computations,
and thus can play a crucial role if type theory is extended with general recursion as in [6].
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the rules of the version of type
theory we are considering. This version can be seen as a simplified version of type theory as
represented in the system Agda [16], and in particular, contrary to the work [7], we allow
η-conversion, and we express conversion as judgment. Markov’s principle can be formulated
in a natural way in this formal system. We describe then the forcing extension of type
theory, where we add a Cohen real. For proving normalization, we follow Tait’s computability
method [18, 15], but we have to consider an extension of this with a computability relation
in order to interpret the conversion judgment. This can be seen as a forcing extension of the
technique used in [1]. Using this computability argument, it is then possible to show that we
cannot show that the generic sequence has to take the value 0. We end by a refinement of
this method, giving a consistent extension of type theory where the negation of Markov’s
principle is provable.
1 The paper [10] presents a model of the calculus of constructions using the idea of modified realizability,
and it seems possible to use also this technique to interpret the type theory we consider and prove in
this way the independence of Markov’s principle.
2 Some authors define independence in the stronger sense “A statement is independent of a formal system
if neither the statement nor its negation is provable in the system”, e.g. [13]. We will establish the
independence of Markov’s principle in this stronger sense with the help of known results from the
literature.
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2 Type theory and forcing extension
A dependent type theory is given by: A syntax describing the set objects of discourse, forms
of judgments, and rules of inference for deriving valid judgments.
The syntax of our type theory is given by the grammar:
t, u,A,B :=x | ⊥rec (λx.A) | unitrec (λx.A) t | boolrec (λx.A) t u | natrec (λx.A) t u
| U | N | N0 | N1 | N2 | 0 | 1 | S t
| Π(x :A)B | λx.t | t u | Σ(x :A)B | (t, u) | t.1 | t.2
The terms N0, N1, N2, and N will denote , respectively, the empty type, the unit type,
the type of booleans, and the type of natural numbers. The term U will denote the universe,
i.e. the type of small types. We use the notation n as a short hand for the term Sn 0, where
S is the successor constructor of natural numbers.
2.1 Type system
We describe a type theory with one universe à la Russell, natural numbers, functional
extensionality and surjective pairing, hereafter referred to as MLTT.3 The type theory has
the following judgment forms: 1. Γ `. 2. Γ ` A. 3. Γ ` t :A. 4. Γ ` A = B. 5. Γ ` t = u :A.
The first expresses that Γ is a well-formed contexts, the second that A is a type in the context
Γ, and the third that t is a term of type A in the context Γ. The fourth and fifth express type
and term equality respectively. Below we outline the inference rules of this type theory. We
use the notation F → G for Π(x : F )G when G doesn’t depend on F and ¬A for A→ N0.
Natural numbers:
Γ `
Γ ` N
Γ `
Γ ` 0:N
Γ ` n :Nnat-suc
Γ ` Sn :N
Γ, x :N ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
natrec-I
Γ ` natrec (λx.F ) a0 g :Π(x :N)F
Γ, x :N ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
natrec-0
Γ ` natrec (λx.F ) a0 g 0 = a0 :F [0]
Γ, x :N ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` n :N Γ ` g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
natrec-suc
Γ ` natrec (λx.F ) a0 g (Sn) = g n (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g n) :F [Sn]
Γ, x :N ` F = G Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])natrec-eq
Γ ` natrec (λx.F ) a0 g = natrec (λx.G) a0 g :Π(x :N)F
Booleans:
Γ `
Γ ` N2
Γ `
Γ ` 0:N2
Γ `
Γ ` 1:N2
Γ, x :N2 ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 :F [1]
boolrec-I
Γ ` boolrec (λx.F ) a0 a1 :Π(x :N2)F
Γ, x :N2 ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 :F [1]
boolrec-0
Γ ` boolrec (λx.F ) a0 a1 0 = a0 :F [0]
3 This is a type system similar to Martin-löf’s [15] except that we have η-conversion and surjective pairing.
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Γ, x :N2 ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 :F [1]
boolrec-1
Γ ` boolrec (λx.F ) a0 a1 1 = a1 :F [1]
Γ, x :N2 ` F = G Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 :F [1]boolrec-eq
Γ ` natrec (λx.F ) a0 a1 = natrec (λx.G) a0 a1 :Π(x :N2)F
Dependent functions:
Γ ` F Γ, x :F ` G
Π-I
Γ ` Π(x :F )G
Γ ` F = H Γ, x :F ` G = E
Π-eq
Γ ` Π(x :F )G = Π(x :H)E
Γ, x :F ` t :G
λ-I
Γ ` λx.t :Π(x :F )G
Γ ` g :Π(x :F )G Γ ` a :F
fun-ap
Γ ` g a :G[a]
Γ, x :F ` t :G Γ ` a :F
β
Γ ` (λx.t)a = t[a] :G[a]
Γ ` g :Π(x :F )G Γ ` u = v :F
fun
Γ ` g u = g v :G[u]
Γ ` h = g :Π(x :F )G Γ ` u :F
fun-eq
Γ ` hu = g u :G[u]
Γ ` h :Π(x :F )G Γ ` g :Π(x :F )G Γ, x :F ` hx = g x :G[x]
fun-ext
Γ ` h = g :Π(x :F )G
Dependent product:
Γ ` F Γ, x :F ` G
Σ-I
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` F = H Γ, x :F ` G = E
Σ-eq
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G = Σ(x :H)E
Γ, x :F ` G Γ ` a :F Γ ` b :G[a]
pr-I
Γ ` (a, b) :Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` t :Σ(x :F )G
pr-e-1 Γ ` t.1:F
Γ ` t :Σ(x :F )G
pr-e-2
Γ ` t.2:G[t.1]
Γ ` (t, u) :Σ(x :F )G
pr1
Γ ` (t, u).1 = t :F
Γ ` (t, u) :Σ(x :F )G
pr2
Γ ` (t, u).2 = u :G[t]
Γ ` t = u :Σ(x :F )G
pr-eq-1
Γ ` t.1 = u.1:F
Γ ` t = u :Σ(x :F )G
pr-eq-1
Γ ` t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]
Γ ` t :Σ(x :F )G Γ ` u :Σ(x :F )G Γ ` t.1 = u.1:F Γ ` t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]
pr-ext
Γ ` t = u :Σ(x :F )G
Universe:
Γ `
Γ ` U
Γ ` F :U
Γ ` F
Γ ` F = G :U
Γ ` F = U
Γ `
Γ ` N :U
Γ `
Γ ` N2 :U
Γ ` F : U Γ, x :F ` G : U
Γ ` Π(x :F )G : U
Γ ` F = H : U Γ, x :F ` G = E : U
Γ ` Π(x :F )G = Π(x :H)E :U
Γ ` F : U Γ, x :F ` G : U
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G : U
Γ ` F = H : U Γ, x :F ` G = E : U
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G = Σ(x :H)E :U
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Congruence:
Γ ` t :F Γ ` F = G
Γ ` t :G
Γ ` t = u :F Γ ` F = G
Γ ` t = u :G
Γ ` F
Γ ` F = F
Γ ` F = G
Γ ` G = F
Γ ` F = G Γ ` G = H
Γ ` F = H
Γ ` t :F
Γ ` t = t :F
Γ ` t = u :F
Γ ` u = t :F
Γ ` t = u :F Γ ` u = v :F
Γ ` t = v :F
For brevity we omitted the rules for the types N0 and N1.
The following four rules are admissible in the this type system [1]:
Γ ` a :A
Γ ` A
Γ ` a = b :A
Γ ` a :A
Γ, x :F ` G Γ ` a = b :F
Γ ` G[a] = G[b]
Γ, x :F ` t :G Γ ` a = b :F
Γ ` t[a] = t[b] :G[a]
2.2 Markov’s principle
Markov’s principle can be represented in type theory by the type
MP := Π(h :N → N2)[¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx))→ Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx)]
where IsZero :N2 → U is defined by IsZero := λy.boolrec (λx.U)N1N0 y.
Note that IsZero (hn) is inhabited when hn = 0 and empty when hn = 1. Thus
Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx) is inhabited if there is n such that hn = 0.
The main result of this paper is the following:
I Theorem 2.1. There is no term t such that MLTT ` t :MP.
An extension of MLTT is given by introducing new objects, judgment forms and derivation
rules. This means in particular that any judgment valid in MLTT is valid in the extension.
A consistent extension is one in which the type N0 is uninhabited.
To show Theorem 2.1 we will form a consistent extension of MLTT with a new consant
f where ` f :N → N2 and ¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x)) → Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x) is not derivable.
Thus MP is not derivable in this extension and consequently not derivable in MLTT.
While this is sufficient to establish independence in the sense of non-derivability of MP.
To establish the independence of MP in the stronger sense one also needs to show that
¬MP is not derivable in MLTT. This can achieved by reference to the work of Aczel [2]
where it is shown that MLTT extended with ` dne :Π(A :U)(¬¬A→ A) is consistent. Since
h :N → N2, x :N ` IsZero (hx) :U we have h :N → N2 ` Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx) :U . Thus
h :N → N2 ` dne (Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx)) :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx))→ Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx)
By λ abstraction we have ` λh.dne (Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx)) :MP. We can then conclude that
there is no term t such that MLTT ` t :¬MP.
Finally, we will refine the result of Theorem 2.1 by building a consistent extension of
MLTT where ¬MP is derivable.
2.3 Forcing extension
A condition p is a graph of a partial finite function from N to {0, 1}. We denote by 〈〉 the
empty condition. We write p(n) = b when (n, b) ∈ p. We say q extends p (written q 6 p)
if p is a subset of q. A condition can be thought of as a compact open in Cantor space
2N. Two conditions p and q are compatible if p ∪ q is a condition and we write pq for p ∪ q,
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otherwise they are incompatible. If n /∈ dom(p) we write p(n, 0) for p∪{(n, 0)} and p(n, 1) for
p ∪ {(n, 1)}. We define the notion of partition corresponding to the notion of finite covering
of a compact open in Cantor space.
I Definition 2.2 (Partition). We write p C p1, . . . , pn to say that p1, . . . , pn is a partition of
p and we define it as follows:
1. p C p.
2. If n /∈ dom(p) and p(n, 0) C . . . , qi, . . . and p(n, 1) C . . . , rj , . . . then p C . . . , qi, . . . , rj , . . . .
Note that if p C p1, . . . , pn then pi and pj are incompatible whenever i 6= j. If moreover
q 6 p then q C . . . , qpj , . . . where pj is compatible with q.
We extend the given type theory by annotating the judgments with conditions, i.e.
replacing each judgment Γ ` J in the given type system with a judgment Γ `p J .
In addition we add the locality rule: Γ `p1 J . . . Γ `pn Jloc p C p1 . . . pnΓ `p J
.
We add a term f for the generic point along with the introduction and conversion rules:
Γ `p
f-I Γ `p f :N → N2
Γ `p
f-eval n ∈ dom(p)
Γ `p f n = p(n) :N2
.
We add a term w and the rule: Γ `pw-term
Γ `p w :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x))
.
Since w inhabits ¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x)), our goal is then to show that no term inhabits
Σ(x :N) IsZero(f x).
It follows directly from the description of the forcing extension that:
I Lemma 2.3. If Γ ` J then Γ `p J for all p. In particular, if ` t :A then `p t :A for all p.
Note that if q 6 p and Γ `p J then Γ `q J (monotonicity). A statement A (represented as a
closed type) is derivable in this extension if `〈〉 t :A for some t, which in turn implies `p t :A
for all p.
Similarly to [7] we can state a conservativity result for this extension. Let ` g :N → N2
and ` v : ¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x)) be two terms of standard type theory. We say that g
is compatible with a condition p if g is such that ` g n = b :N2 whenever (n, b) ∈ p and
` g n = 0:N2 otherwise. We say that v is compatible with a condition p if g is compatible
with p and v is given by v := λx.x (np, 0) where np is the smallest natural number such
that np /∈ dom(p). To see that v is well typed, note that by design Γ ` g np = 0 :N2 thus
Γ ` IsZero (g np) = N1 and Γ ` (np, 0) : Σ(x :N)IsZero (g x). We have then Γ, x : ¬(Σ(y :
N) IsZero (g y)) ` x (np, 0) :N0 thus Γ ` λx.x (np, 0) :¬¬(Σ(y :N) IsZero (g y)).
I Lemma 2.4 (Conservativity). Let ` g : N → N2 and ` v : ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (g x)) be
compatible with p. If Γ `p J then Γ[g/f, v/w] ` J [g/f, v/w], i.e. replacing f with g then w
with v we obtain a valid judgment in standard type theory. In particular, if Γ `〈〉 J where
neither f nor w occur in Γ or J then Γ ` J is a valid judgment in standard type theory.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the type system and it is straightforward for all the
standard rules. For (f-eval) we have (f n)[g/f, v/w] := g n and since g is compatible
with p we have Γ[g/f, v/w] ` g n = p(n) : N2 whenever n ∈ dom(p). For (w-term) we
have (w : ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x)))[g/f, v/w] := (w : ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (g x)))[v/w] := v :
¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x)). For (loc) the statement follows from the observation that when
g is compatible with p and p C p1, . . . , pn then g is compatible with exactly one pi for
1 6 i 6 n. J
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3 A Semantics of the forcing extension
In this section we outline a semantics for the forcing extension given in the previous section.
We will interpret the judgments of type theory by computability predicates and relations
defined by reducibility to computable weak head normal forms.
3.1 Reduction rules
We extend the β, ι conversion with f n ⇒p b whenever (n, b) ∈ p. In order to ease the
presentation of the proofs and definitions we introduce evaluation contexts following [20].
E ::=[ ] | Eu | E.1 | E.2 | SE | f E
⊥rec (λx.C)E | unitrec (λx.C) aE | boolrec (λx.C) a0 a1 E | natrec (λx.C) cz g E
An expression E[e] is then the expression resulting from replacing the hole [ ] by e. We
reserve the symbols E and C for evaluation contexts. We have the following reduction rules:
unitrec (λx.C) c 0→ c boolrec (λx.C) c0 c1 0→ c0 boolrec (λx.C) c0 c1 1→ c1
natrec (λx.C) cz g 0→ cz natrec (λx.C) cz g (S k)→ g k (natrec (λx.C) cz g k)
(λx.t) a→ t[a/x] (u, v).1→ u (u, v).2→ v
e→ e′
e→p e′
k ∈ dom(p)
f-red
f k →p p(k)
e→p e′
E[e]⇒p E[e′]
Note that we reduce under S.
The relation ⇒ is monotone, that is if q 6 p and t⇒p u then t⇒q u. We will also need
to show that the reduction is local, i.e. if p C p1, . . . , pn and t⇒pi u then t⇒p u.
I Lemma 3.1. If m /∈ dom(p) and t→p(m,0) u and t→p(m,1) u then t→p u.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of t→p(m,0) u. If t→p(m,0) u is derived by (f-red)
then t := f k and u := p(m, 0)(k) for some k ∈ dom(p(m, 0)). But since we also have a
reduction f k →p(m,1) u, we have p(m, 1)(k) := u := p(m, 0)(k) which could only be the case if
k ∈ dom(p). Thus we have a reduction f k →p u := p(k). Alternatively, we have a derivation
t→ u, in which case we have t→p u directly. J
I Lemma 3.2. If m /∈ dom(p) and t⇒p(m,0) u and t⇒p(m,1) u then t⇒p u.
Proof. From the reduction t ⇒p(k,0) u we have t := E[e], u := E[e′] and e →p(m,0) e′ for
some context E. But then we also have a reduction E[e]⇒p(m,1) E[e′], thus e→p(m,1) e′. By
Lemma 3.1, we have e→p e′ and thus E[e]⇒p E[e′]. J
I Lemma 3.3. Let q 6 p. If t→q u then either t→p u or t has the form E[fm] for some
m ∈ dom(q) \ dom(p).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of t →q u. If the reduction t →q u has the form
f k →q q(k) then either k /∈ dom(p) and the statement follows or k ∈ dom(p) and we have
t→p u. Alternatively, we have t→ u and immediately t→p u. J
I Lemma 3.4. Let q 6 p. If t⇒q u then either t⇒p u or t has the form E[fm] for some
m ∈ dom(q) \ dom(p).
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Proof. If t⇒q u then t := E[e], u := E[e′] and e→q e′ for some context E. By Lemma 3.3
either e := C[fm] for m /∈ dom(p) and the statement follows or e →p e′ in which case we
have t⇒p u. J
I Corollary 3.5. For any condition p and m /∈ dom(p). Let t⇒p(m,0) u and t⇒p(m,1) v. If
u := v then t⇒p u; otherwise, t has the form E[fm].
Proof. Follows by Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.4. J
Next we define the relation p ` t⇒ u :A to mean t⇒p u and `p t = u :A and we write
p ` A ⇒ B for p ` A ⇒ B : U . We note that it holds that if p ` t ⇒ u : Π(x : F )G and
` a : F then p ` t a ⇒ u a :G[a] and if p ` t ⇒ u : Σ(x : F )G then p ` t.1 ⇒ u.1 : F and
p ` t.2⇒ u.2:G[t.1]. We define a closure for this relation as follows:
`p t :A
p ` t⇒∗ t :A
p ` t⇒ u :A
p ` t⇒∗ u :A
p ` t⇒ u :A p ` u⇒∗ v :A
p ` t⇒∗ v :A
`p A
p ` A⇒∗ A
p ` A⇒ B
p ` A⇒∗ B
p ` A⇒ B p ` B ⇒∗ C
p ` A⇒∗ C
A term t is in p-whnf if whenever t⇒p u then t := u. A whnf is canonical if it has the
form 0,1,n, λx.t, f, w, ⊥rec (λx.C), unitrec (λx.C) a, boolrec (λx.C) a0 a1, natrec (λx.C) cz g,
N0,N1,N2,N ,U ,Π(x :F )G, or Σ(x :F )G. A p-whnf is proper if it is canonical or it is of the
form E[f k] for k /∈ dom(p).
We have the following corollaries to Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.5.
I Corollary 3.6. Let m /∈ dom(p). Let p(m, 0) ` t⇒p(m,0) u :A and p(m, 1) ` t⇒p(m,1) v :A.
If u := v then p ` t⇒ u :A; otherwise t has the form E[fm].
I Corollary 3.7. If p ` t ⇒ u : A and q 6 p then q ` t ⇒ u : A. If p C p1, . . . , pn and
pi ` t⇒ u :A for all i then p ` t⇒ u :A.
Proof. Let q 6 p. If t ⇒p u we have t ⇒q u and if `p t = u :A then `q t = u :A. Thus
q ` t ⇒ u :A whenever p ` t ⇒ u :A. Let p C p1, . . . , pn. If for all i, t ⇒pi u :A then from
Lemma 3.2, by induction on the partition, we have t⇒p u :A. If `pi t = u :A for all i, then
`p t = u :A. Thus we have p ` t⇒ u :A whenever pi ` t⇒ u :A for all i. J
From the above we can show that closure ⇒∗ is monotone, it is not however local.
For a closed term `p t :A, we say that t has a p-whnf if p ` t⇒∗ u :A and u is in p-whnf.
If moreover u is canonical, respectively proper, we say that t has a canonical, respectively
proper, p-whnf. Since the reduction relation is deterministic we have
I Lemma 3.8. A term `p t :A has at most one p-whnf.
I Corollary 3.9. Let `p t :A and m /∈ dom(p). If t has proper p(m, 0)-whnf and a proper
p(m, 1)-whnf then t has a proper p-whnf.
Proof. Let p(m, 0) ` t⇒∗ u :A and p(m, 1) ` t⇒∗ v :A with u in proper p(m, 0)-whnf and
v in proper p(m, 1)-whnf. If t := u or t := v then t is already in proper p-whnf. Alternatively
we have reductions p(m, 0) ` t⇒ u1 :A and p(m, 1) ` t⇒ v1 :A. By Corollary 3.6 either t is
in proper p-whnf or u1 := v1 and p ` t⇒ u1 :A. It then follows by induction that u1, and
thus t, has a proper p-whnf. J
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3.2 Computability predicate and relation
We define inductively a forcing relation p  A to express that a type A is computable at
p. Mutually by recursion we define relations p  a :A, p  A = B, and p  a = b :A. The
definition fits the generalized mutual induction-recursion schema [8]4.
I Definition 3.10 (Computibility predicate and relation).
(FN0) If p ` A⇒∗ N0 then p  A.
1. p  t :A does not hold for all t.
2. p  t = u :A does not hold for all t and u.
3. If p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B ⇒∗ N0.
(ii) p ` B ⇒∗ E[fm] for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  A = B for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(FN1) If p ` A⇒∗ N1 then p  A.
1. p  t :A if
(i) p ` t⇒∗ 0:A.
(ii) p ` t⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
3. If p  t :A and p  u :A then p  t = u :A if
(i) p ` t⇒∗ 0:A and p ` u⇒∗ 0:A.
(ii) p ` t⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t = u :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(iii) p ` u⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t = u :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B ⇒∗ N1.
(ii) p ` B ⇒∗ E[fm] for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  A = B for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(FN2) If p ` A⇒∗ N2 then p  A.
1. p  t :A if
(i) p ` t⇒∗ b :A for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) p ` t⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
3. If p  t :A and p  u :A then p  t = u :A if
(i) p ` t⇒∗ b :A and p ` u⇒∗ b :A for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) p ` t⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t = u :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(iii) p ` u⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t = u :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B ⇒∗ N2.
(ii) p ` B ⇒∗ E[fm] for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  A = B for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(FN) If p ` A⇒∗ N then p  A.
1. p  t :A if
(i) p ` t⇒∗ n :A for some n ∈ N.
(ii) p ` t⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
3. If p  t :A and p  u :A then p  t = u :A if
(i) p ` t⇒∗ n :A and p ` u⇒∗ n :A for some n ∈ N.
(ii) p ` t⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t = u :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(iii) p ` u⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  t = u :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B ⇒∗ N .
(ii) p ` B ⇒∗ E[fm] for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  A = B for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
4 However, for the canonical proof below we actually need something weaker than an inductive-recursive
definition (arbitrary fixed-point instead of least fixed-point), reflecting the fact that the universe is
defined in an open way [15].
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(FΠ) If p ` A ⇒∗ Π(x : F )G then p  A if p  F and for all q 6 p, q  G[a] whenever
q  a :F and q  G[a] = G[b] whenever q  a = b :F .
1. If `p f : A then p  f : A if for all q 6 p, q  f a : G[a] whenever q  a : F and
q  f a = f b :G[a] whenever q  a = b :F .
2. If p  f :A and p  g :A then p  f = g :A if for all q 6 p, q  f a = g a :G[a]
whenever q  a :F .
3. If p  B then p  A = B if
(i) `p A = B and p ` B ⇒∗ Π(x : H)E and p  F = H and for all q 6 p,
q  G[a] = E[a] whenever q  a :F .
(ii) p ` B ⇒∗ E[fm] for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  A = B for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(FΣ) If p ` A ⇒∗ Σ(x : F )G then p  A if p  F and for all q 6 p, q  G[a] whenever
q  a :F and q  G[a] = G[b] whenever q  a = b :F .
1. If `p t :A then p  t :A if p  t.1:F and p  t.2:G[t.1].
2. If p  t :A and p  u :A then p  t = u :A if p  t.1 = u.1:F and p  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1].
3. If p  B then p  A = B if
(i) `p A = B and p ` B ⇒∗ Σ(x : H)E and p  F = H and for all q 6 p,
q  G[a] = E[a] whenever q  a :F .
(ii) p ` B ⇒∗ E[fm] for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  A = B for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
(FU) If p ` A⇒∗ U then p  A.
1. p  C :A if
(i) p ` C ⇒∗ M :A for M ∈ {N0, N1, N2, N}.
(ii) p ` C ⇒∗ Π(x :F )G :A and p  F :A and for all q 6 p, q  G[a] :A whenever
q  a :F and q  G[a] = G[b] :A whenever q  a = b :F .
(iii) p ` C ⇒∗ Σ(x :F )G :A and p  F :A and for all q 6 p, q  G[a] :A whenever
q  a :F and q  G[a] = G[b] :A whenever q  a = b :F .
(iv) p ` C ⇒∗ E[fm] :A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  C :A for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
5. If p  C :A and p  D :A then p  C = D :A if
(i) p ` C ⇒∗ M :A and D ⇒∗ M :A for M ∈ {N0, N1, N2, N}.
(ii) p ` C ⇒∗ Π(x :F )G :A and p ` D ⇒∗ Π(x :H)E :A and p  F = H :A and for
all q 6 p, q  G[a] = E[a] :A whenever q  a :F .
(iii) p ` C ⇒∗ Σ(x :F )G :A and p ` D ⇒∗ Σ(x :H)E :A and p  F = H :A and for
all q 6 p, q  G[a] = E[a] :A whenever q  a :F .
(iv) p ` C ⇒∗ E[fm] : A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  C = D : A for all
i ∈ {0, 1}.
(v) p ` D ⇒∗ E[fm] : A for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  C = D : A for all
i ∈ {0, 1}.
6. If p  B then p  A = B if p ` B ⇒∗ U .
(FLoc) If p ` A ⇒∗ E[fm] for some m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, i)  A for all i ∈ {0, 1} then
p  A.
1. If p(m, i)  t :A for all i ∈ {0, 1} then p  t :A.
2. If p  t :A and p  u :A and p(m, i)  t :A for all i ∈ {0, 1} then p  t = u :A.
3. If p  B then p  A = B if p(m, i)  A = B for all i ∈ {0, 1}.
We note from the definition that when p  A = B then p  A and p  B, when p  a :A
then p  A and when p  a = b :A then p  a :A and p  b :A. We remark also if p ` A⇒∗ U
then A := U since we have only one universe.
The clause (FLoc) gives semantics to variable types. For example, if p := {(0, 0)} and
q := {(0, 1)} the type R := boolrec (λx.U)N1N (f 0) has reductions p ` R ⇒∗ N1 and
q ` R⇒∗ N . Thus p  R and q  R and since 〈〉 C p, q we have 〈〉  R.
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Immediately from Definition 3.10 we get:
I Lemma 3.11. If p  A then `p A. If p  a :A then `p a :A.
I Lemma 3.12. If p  A then there is a partition p C p1, . . . , pn where A has a canonical
pi-whnf for all i.
Proof. The statement follows from the definition by induction on the derivation of p  A J
I Corollary 3.13. Let p C p1, . . . , pn. If pi  A for all i then A has a proper p-whnf.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.12 and Corollary 3.9 by induction on the partition. J
I Lemma 3.14. If p  A and q 6 p then q  A.
Proof. Let p  A and q 6 p. By induction on the derivation of p  A:
(FN) Since p ` A⇒∗ N and the reduction relation is monotone we have q ` A⇒∗ N , thus
q  A. The statement follows similarly for (FN0), (FN1), (FN2) and (FU).
(FΠ) Let p ` A⇒∗ Π(x :F )G. Since p  F , by induction q  F . Let s 6 q, we have then
s 6 p. It then follows from p  A that s  G[a] whenever s  a :F and s  G[a] = G[b]
whenever s  a = b :F . Thus q  A. The statement follows similarly for (FΣ).
(FLoc) Let p ` A ⇒∗ E[fm]. If m ∈ dom(q) then q 6 p(m, 0) or q 6 p(m, 1) and since
p(m, i)  A, by induction q  A. Alternatively, q ` A⇒∗ E[fm]. But q C q(m, 0), q(m, 1)
and q(m, i) 6 p(m, i). By induction q(m, i)  A for all i ∈ {0, 1} and thus q  A. J
I Lemma 3.15. If p  t :A and q 6 p then q  t :A.
Proof. Let p  t :A and q 6 p. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(FN) Since p ` A ⇒∗ N then q ` A ⇒∗ N . By induction on the derivation of p  t :A.
If p ` t ⇒∗ n : A for n ∈ N then q ` t ⇒∗ n : A, hence, q  t : A. Alternatively,
p ` t⇒∗ E[f k] :A for some k /∈ dom(p) and p(k, b)  t :A for all b ∈ {0, 1}. If k ∈ dom(q)
then q 6 p(k, 1) or q 6 p(k, 0) and in either case, by induction, q  t :A. Otherwise, we
have q(k, b) 6 p(k, b) and by induction q(k, b)  t :A for all b. By the definition q  t :A.
The statement follows similarly for (FN0), (FN1), and (FN2).
(FU) We can show the statement by a proof similar to that of Lemma 3.14.
(FΠ) Let p ` A⇒∗ Π(x :F )G. We have q ` A⇒∗ Π(x :F )G. From `p t :A we have `q t :A.
Let r 6 q. If r  a :F then since r 6 p we have r  t a :G[a]. Similarly if r  a = b :F
then r  t a = t b :G[a]. Thus q  t :A.
(FΣ) Let p ` A⇒∗ Σ(x :F )G. We have q ` A⇒∗ Σ(x :F )G. From `p t :A we have `q t :A.
Since p  t :A we have p  t.1 : F and p  t.2 :G[t.1]. By induction q  t.1 : F and
q  t.2:G[t.1], thus q  t :A.
(FLoc) Let p ` A⇒∗ E[f k] for some k /∈ dom(p). Since p  t :A we have p(k, b)  t :A for
all b ∈ {0, 1}. If k ∈ dom(q) then q 6 p(k, 0) or q 6 p(k, 1) and by induction q  t :A.
Otherwise, q ` A⇒∗ E[f k] and since q(k, b) 6 p(k, b), by induction, q(k, b)  t :A for all
b. By definition q  t :A. J
Using similar arguments we can also show the following two statements:
I Lemma 3.16. Let p  A. If p  A = B and q 6 p then q  A = B.
I Lemma 3.17. Let p  A. If p  t = u :A and q 6 p then q  t = u :A.
We collect the results of Lemmas 3.14, Lemma 3.15, Lemma 3.17, and Lemma 3.16 in
the following corollary.
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I Corollary 3.18 (Monotonicity). If p  J and q 6 p then q  J .
We write  J when 〈〉  J . By monotonicity  J iff p  J for all p.
I Lemma 3.19. If p(m, 0)  A and p(m, 1)  A for some m /∈ dom(p) then p  A.
Proof. By Corollary 3.13, either A has a canonical p-whnf or p ` A⇒∗ E[f k] for k /∈ dom(p).
If p ` A⇒∗ M with M ∈ {N0, N1, N2, N} then we have immediately that p  A.
If p ` A ⇒∗ M with M of the form Π(x : F )G or Σ(x : F )G then p(m, b) ` A ⇒∗ M
for all b ∈ {0, 1}. Since p(m, b)  A we have p(m, b)  F for all b and by induction
p  F . Let q 6 p and q  a :F . If m ∈ dom(q) then q 6 p(m, b) for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
Assume, w.l.o.g, q 6 p(m, 0). Since p(m, 0)  A we have by the definition that q  G[a].
Alternatively, if m /∈ dom(q) we have a partition q C q(m, 0), q(m, 1). By monotonicity
q(m, b)  a :F , and since q(m, b) 6 p(m, b), we have q(m, b)  G[a] for all b ∈ {0, 1}. By
induction q  G[a]. Similarly we can show q  G[a] = G[b] whenever q  a = b :F .
Alternatively, p ` A⇒∗ E[f k] for some k /∈ dom(p). If k = m then by the definition p  A.
Otherwise, p(m, 0) ` A⇒∗ E[f k] and by the definition p(m, 0)(k, b)  A for all b ∈ {0, 1}.
Similarly, p(m, 1)(k, b)  A for all b ∈ {0, 1}. But p(k, b) C p(m, 0)(k, b), p(m, 1)(k, b). By
induction p(k, b)  A for all b ∈ {0, 1} and thus p  A. J
Similarly we can show the following two statements:
I Lemma 3.20. 1. If p(m, 0)  t :A and p(m, 1)  t :A for some m /∈ dom(p) then p  t :A.
2. If p(m, 0)  t = u :A and p(m, 1)  t = u :A for some m /∈ dom(p) then p  t = u :A.
I Lemma 3.21. If p(m, 0)  A = B and p(m, 1)  A = B for some m /∈ dom(p) then
p  A = B.
I Corollary 3.22 (Local character). If p C p1, . . . , pn and pi  J for all i then p  J .
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.19, Lemma 3.20, and Lemma 3.21 by induction. J
I Lemma 3.23. Let p ` A ⇒∗ M where M ∈ {N1, N2, N}. If p  a :A then there is a
partition p C p1, . . . , pn where a has a canonical pi-whnf for all i. If p  a = b :A then there
is a partition p C q1, . . . , qm where a and b have the same canonical qj-whnf for each j.
Proof. Follows by induction from the definition. J
I Lemma 3.24. Let p  A = B.
1. If p  t :A then p  t :B and if p  u :B then p  u :A.
2. If p  t = u :A then p  t = u :B and if p  v = w :B then p  v = w :A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(FN) By induction on the derivation of p  A = B. (i) Let p ` B ⇒∗ N then the statement
follows directly. (ii) Let p ` B ⇒∗ E[fm] for m /∈ dom(p) and p(m, b)  A = B for all
b ∈ {0, 1}. Let p  t :A. By monotonicity p(m, b)  t :A and by induction p(m, b)  t :B
for all b. By the definition p  t :B. Let p  u :B. By monotonicity p(m, b)  u :B and
p(m, b)  A = B. By induction p(m, b)  u :A for all b. By local character p  u :A.
Similarly we can show the second statement. The statement follows similarly for (FN1)
and (FN2).
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(FΠ) Let p ` A ⇒∗ Π(x : F )G. By induction on the derivation of p  A = B. (i) Let
`p A = B and p ` B ⇒∗ Π(x :H)E and p  F = H and for all q 6 p, q  G[a] = E[a]
whenever q  a :F . If p  f :A then `p f :A, thus `p f :B. Let q 6 p and q  u :H. By
monotonicity q  F = H. By induction q  u :F , hence, q  f u :G[u] and by induction
q  f u :E[u]. Similarly, q  f u = f v :E[u] whenever q  u = v :H. Thus p  f :B.
Similarly, if p  g :B we get p  g :A. (ii) Let p ` B ⇒∗ E[f, k] and p(k, b)  A = B
for all b ∈ {0, 1}. If p  f :A then by monotonicity p(k, b)  f :A and by induction
p(k, b)  f :B for all b. By the definition p  f :B. If on the other hand p  g :B then
by definition p(k, b)  g :B and by induction p(k, b)  g :A for all b. By local character
p  g :A. Similarly we can show the second statement.
(FΣ) Let p ` A ⇒∗ Σ(x : F )G. By induction on the derivation of p  A = B. (i) Let
`p A = B and p ` B ⇒∗ Σ(x :H)E and p  F = H and for all q 6 p, q  G[a] = E[a]
whenever q  a :F . If p  t :A then `p t :A, thus `p t :B. Since p  t.1:F , by induction
p  t.1 :H. Since p  t.2 :H[t.1], by induction p  t.2 :E[t.1]. Thus p  t :B. Similarly
if p  u :B we have p  u :A. (ii) Let p ` B ⇒∗ E[f, k] and p(k, b)  A = B for all
b ∈ {0, 1}. If p  t :A then by monotonicity p(k, b)  t :A and by induction p(k, b)  t :B
for all b. By the definition p  f :B. If on the other hand p  g :B then by definition
p(k, b)  g :B and by induction p(k, b)  g :A for all b. By local character p  g :A.
Similarly we can show the second statement.
(FU) Since p  A = B, we have p ` B ⇒∗ U and the statements follow directly.
(FLoc) Let p ` A⇒∗ E[f k] for some k /∈ dom(p). Since p  A = B, we have p(k, b)  A = B
for all b ∈ {0, 1}. If p  t :A then p(k, b)  t :A and by induction p(k, b)  t :B for all b.
By the definition p  t :B. If p  u :B then p(k, b)  u :B and by induction p(k, b)  u :A
for all b. By local character p  u :A. Similarly we can show the second statement. J
From the above results we can show that the relations p  − = − and p  − = − :A are
equivalence relations. We omit the proof here.
I Lemma 3.25.
Reflexivity: If p  A then p  A = A and if p  t :A then p  t = t :A.
Symmetry: If p  A = B then p  B = A and if p  t = u :A then p  u = t :A.
Transitivity: If p  A = B and p  B = C then p  A = C and if p  t = u : A and
p  u = v :A then p  t = v :A.
4 Soundness
In this section we show that the type theory described in Section 2 is sound with respect
to the semantics described in Section 3. That is, we aim to show that for any judgment J
whenever `p J then p  J .
I Lemma 4.1. If p ` A⇒∗ B and p  B then p  A and p  A = B.
Proof. Follows from the definition. J
I Lemma 4.2. Let p  A. If p ` t⇒ u :A and p  u :A then p  t :A and p  t = u :A.
Proof. Let p ` t⇒ u :A and p  u :A. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(FU) That is, p ` A⇒∗ U . The statement follows similarly to Lemma 4.1.
(FN) By induction on the derivation of p  u :A. If p ` u ⇒∗ n :N for some n ∈ N then
p ` t ⇒∗ n :N and the statement follows by the definition. If p ` u ⇒∗ E[f k] :A for
k /∈ dom(p) and p(k, b)  u :A for all b ∈ {0, 1} then since p(k, b) ` t⇒ u :A, by induction,
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p(k, b)  t :A and p(k, b)  t = u :A. By the definition p  t :A and p  t = u :A. The
statement follows similarly for (FN1), (FN2).
(FΠ) Let p ` A⇒∗ Π(x :F )G. Since p ` t⇒ u :A we have `p t :A. Let q 6 p and q  a :F .
We have q ` t a ⇒ u a :G[a]. By induction q  t a :G[a] and q  t a = u a :G[a]. If
q  a = b :F we similarly get q  t b :G[b] and q  t b = u b :G[b]. Since q  G[a] = G[b],
by Lemma 3.24, q  t b = u b :G[a]. But q  u a = u b :G[a]. By symmetry and transitivity
q  t a = t b :G[a]. Thus p  t :A and p  t = u :A.
(FΣ) Let p ` A ⇒∗ Σ(x : F )G. From p ` t ⇒ u : A we have `p t : A and we have
p ` t.1⇒ u.1:F and p ` t.2⇒ u.2:G[u.1]. By induction p  t.1:F and p  t.1 = u.1:F .
By induction p  t.2 :G[u.1] and p  t.2 = u.2 :G[u.1]. But since p  A and we have
shown p  t.1 = u.1:F we get p  G[t.1] = G[u.1]. By Lemma 3.24, p  t.2:G[t.1] and
p  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]. Thus p  t :A and p  t = u :A
(FLoc) Let p ` A ⇒∗ E[f k] for k /∈ dom(p). Since p  u : A we have p(k, b)  u : A
for all b ∈ {0, 1}. But we have p(k, b) ` t ⇒ u : A. By induction p(k, b)  t : A and
p(k, b)  t = u :A. By the definition p  t :A and p  t = u :A. J
I Corollary 4.3. Let p ` t⇒∗ u :A and p  A. If p  u :A then p  t :A and p  t = u :A.
I Corollary 4.4.  f :N → N2.
Proof. It’s direct to see that  N → N2. For an arbitrary condition p let p  n :N . By
Lemma 3.23, we have a parition p C p1, . . . , pm where for each i, pi ` n ⇒∗ mi : N for
some mi ∈ N. We have thus a reduction pi ` f n ⇒∗ fmi : N2. If mi ∈ dom(pi) then
pi ` f n ⇒∗ fmi ⇒ bi :N2 for some bi ∈ {0, 1} and by definition pi  f n :N2. If for any j,
mj /∈ dom(pj) then pj(mj , 0) ` f n ⇒∗ fmj ⇒ 0 :N2 and pj(mj , 1) ` f n ⇒∗ fmj ⇒ 1 :N2.
Thus pj(mj , 0)  f n :N2 and pj(mj , 1)  f n :N2. By the definition pj  f n :N2. We thus
have that pi  f n :N2 for all i and by local character p  f n :N2. Similarly we can show
p  f n1 = f n2 :N2 whenever p  n1 = n2 :N . Hence ` f :N → N2. J
I Lemma 4.5. If `p t :¬A and p  A then p  t :¬A iff for all q 6 p there is no term u
such that q  u :A.
Proof. Let p  A and `p t :¬A. We have directly that p  ¬A. Let p  t :¬A. If q  u :A
for some q 6 p, then q  t u :N0 which is impossible. Conversely, assume it is the case that
for all q 6 p there is no u for which q  u :A. Since r  a :A and r  a = b :A never hold
for any r 6 p, the statement “r  t a :N0 whenever r  a :A and r  t a = t b :N0 whenever
r  a = b :A” holds trivially. J
I Lemma 4.6.  w :¬¬(Σ(x :N)IsZero(f x)).
Proof. By Lemma 4.5 it is enough to show that for all q there is no term u for which
q  u : ¬(Σ(x : N)IsZero(f x)). Assume q  u : ¬(Σ(x : N)IsZero(f x)) for some u. Let
m /∈ dom(q) we have then q(m, 0)  (m, 0) : Σ(x :N)IsZero(f x) thus q(m, 0)  u (m, 0) :N0
which is impossible. J
Let Γ := x1 : A1 . . . , xn : An[x1, . . . , xn−1] and ρ := a1, . . . , an. We say p  ρ : Γ if
p  a1 :A, . . . , p  an :An[a1, . . . , an−1]. If moreover σ := b1, . . . , bn and p  σ : Γ, we say
p  ρ = σ :Γ if p  a1 = b1 :A1, . . . , p  an = bn :An[a1, . . . , an−1].
I Lemma 4.7. Let Γ `p. For all q 6 p, if q  ρ :Γ, q  σ :Γ and q  ρ = σ :Γ then
If Γ `p A then q  Aρ = Aσ and if Γ `p A = B then q  Aρ = Bρ.
If Γ `p a :A then q  aρ = aσ :Aρ and if Γ `p a = b :A then q  aρ = bρ :Aρ
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the rules of the type system. We show that if the
statement holds for the premise of the rule it holds for the conclusion. For economy of
presentation we only present the proof for few selected rules. For the rest of the rules the
proof follows in a similar fashion.
For the elimination rules (β), (unitrec-0), (boolrec-0), (boolrec-1), (natrec-0),
(natrec-suc), (pr1), (pr2) and (f-eval) the statement follows from Corollary 4.3.
For the congruence rules the statement follows from Lemma 3.24, Lemma 3.25.
The statement follows for (f-i) by Corollary 4.4, for (w-term) by Lemma 4.6, and for
(loc) by Lemma 3.22.
(nat-suc) By induction q  nρ = nσ : N . By Lemma 3.23 there is a partition q C
q1, . . . , q` where for each i, qi ` nρ⇒∗ mi :N and qi ` nσ ⇒∗ mi :N for somemi ∈ N. But
then qi ` Snρ⇒∗ Smi :N and qi ` Snσ ⇒∗ Smi :N for all i. Thus qi  Snρ = Snσ :N
for all i and by local character q  Snρ = Snσ :N .
(Π-i) By induction q  Fρ = Fσ. Let r 6 q. We have r  (ρ, c) = (ρ, b) : (Γ, x :
F ) whenever r  c = b : F and by induction r  Gρ[c] = Gρ[b]. We have then
q  Π(x : Fρ)Gρ and similarly q  Π(x : Fσ)Gσ. Whenever r  a : Fρ then, by
Lemma 3.24, r  (ρ, a) = (σ, a) : (Γ, x :F ) and by induction r  Gρ[a] = Gσ[a]. Thus
q  Π(x :Fρ)Gρ = Π(x :Fσ)Gσ.
(λ-i) From Γ, x :F `p t :G we have Γ `p F and Γ, x :F `p G. Similarly to (Π-i) we can show
q  Π(x :Fρ)Gρ, q  Π(x :Fσ)Gσ, and q  Π(x :Fρ)Gρ = Π(x :Fσ)Gσ. Let r 6 q and
r  a :Fρ. We have r  (ρ, a) = (σ, a) : (Γ, x :F ) and by induction r  tρ[a] = tσ[a] :Gρ[a].
But r ` (λx.tρ) a ⇒ tρ[a] :Gρ[a] and r ` (λx.tσ) a ⇒ tσ[a] :Gσ[a]. By Lemma 4.2 one
has r  (λx.tρ) a = tρ[a] :Gρ[a] and r  (λx.tσ) a = tσ[a] :Gσ[a]. Since by induction we
have r  Gρ[a] = Gσ[a], by Lemma 3.24, r  (λx.tσ) a = tσ[a] :Gρ[a]. By symmetry
and transitivity r  (λx.tρ)a = (λx.tσ)a :Gρ[a]. Similarly we can show r  (λx.tρ) a =
(λx.tρ) b :Π(x :Fρ)Gρ whenever r  a = b :Fρ and r  (λx.tσ) a = (λx.tσ) b :Π(x :Fσ)Gσ
whenever r  a = b :Fσ. Thus q  (λx.tρ) = (λx.tσ) :Π(x :Fρ)Gρ
(⊥rec-i-e) Follows trivially since r  t :N0 never holds for any condition r.
(natrec-i) While we omit the proof here the basic idea is as follows: If for some r 6 q we
have r  t :N then by Lemma 3.23, we have r C r1, . . . , rn and for each i, ri ` t⇒∗ Ski0
for some ki ∈ N. By induction on ki we can show ri  (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g)ρ t :Fρ[t] for all
i. By local character we will then have r  (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g)ρ t :Fρ[t]. Similarly we can
show r  (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g)ρ t = (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g)ρ u :Fρ[t] whenever r  t = u :N .
By the definition we will have q  (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g)ρ :Π(x :N)Fρ and similarly we can
show q  (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g)ρ = (natrec (λx.F ) a0 g)σ :Π(x :N)Fρ. J
I Theorem 4.8 (Fundamental Theorem). If `p J then p  J .
5 Markov’s principle
Now we have enough machinery to show the independence of MP from type theory. The
idea is that if a judgment J is derivable in type theory (i.e. ` J) then it is derivable in the
forcing extension (i.e. `〈〉 J) and by Theorem 4.8 it holds in the interpretation (i.e.  J). It
thus suffices to show that there no t such that  t :MP to establish the independence of MP
from type theory. First we recall the formulation of MP.
MP := Π(h :N → N2)[¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx))→ Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx)]
where IsZero :N2 → U is given by IsZero := λy.boolrec (λx.U)N1N0 y.
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I Lemma 5.1. There is no term t such that  t :Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x).
Proof. Assume  t : Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x) for some t. We then have  t.1 : N and 
t.2 : IsZero (f t.1). By Lemma 3.23, one has a partition 〈〉 C p1, . . . , pn where for each i,
pi ` t.1⇒∗ mi for some mi ∈ N. Hence pi ` IsZero (f t.1)⇒∗ IsZero (fmi) and by Lemma 4.1,
pi  IsZero (f t.1) = IsZero (fmi). But, by definition, a partition of 〈〉must contain a condition,
say pj , such that pj(k) = 1 whenever k ∈ dom(pj) (this holds vacuously for 〈〉 C 〈〉).
Assume mj ∈ dom(pj), then pj ` IsZero (f t.1) ⇒∗ IsZero (fmj) ⇒∗ N0. By monotonicity,
from  t.2 : IsZero (f t.1) we get pj  t.2 : IsZero (f t.1). But pj ` IsZero (f t.1) ⇒∗ N0
thus pj  IsZero (f t.1) = N0. Hence, by Lemma 3.24, pj  t.2 : N0 which is impossible,
thus contradicting our assumption. If on the other hand mj /∈ dom(pj) then since pj C
pj(mj , 0), pj(mj , 1) we can apply the above argument with pj(mj , 1) instead of pj . J
I Lemma 5.2. There is no term t such that  t :MP.
Proof. Assume  t :MP for some t. From the definition, whenever  g :N → N2 we have
 t g :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x))→ Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x). Since by Corollary 4.4,  f :N → N2
we have  t f : ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x)) → Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x). Since by Lemma 4.6,
 w :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x)) we have,  (t f)w :Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x) which is impossible by
Lemma 5.1. J
From Theorem 4.8, Lemma 5.2, and Lemma 2.3 we can then conclude:
I Theorem 2.1. There is no term t such that MLTT ` t :MP.
5.1 Many Cohen reals
We extend the type system in Section 2 further by adding a generic point fq for each condition
q. The introduction and conversion rules for fq are given by:
Γ `p
Γ `p fq :N → N2
Γ `p
n ∈ dom(q)Γ `p fq n = 1
Γ `p
n /∈ dom(q), n ∈ dom(p) .
Γ `p fq n = p(n)
With the reduction rules: n ∈ dom(q)
fq n→ 1
n /∈ dom(q), n ∈ dom(p)
fq n→p p(n)
.
We observe that the reduction relation is still monotone.
For each fq we add a term
Γ `p
Γ `p wq :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (fq x))
.
Finally we add a term mw witnessing the negation of MP Γ `p
Γ `p mw :¬MP
.
By analogy to Corollary 4.4 we have:
I Lemma 5.3.  fq :N → N2 for all q.
I Lemma 5.4.  wq :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (fq x)) for all q.
Proof. Assume p  t :¬(Σ(x :N)IsZero (fq x)) for some p and t. Let m /∈ dom(q) ∪ dom(p),
we have p(m, 0)  fqm = 0. Thus p(m, 0)  (m, 0) : Σ(x : N) IsZero (fq x) and p(m, 0) 
t (m, 0) :N0 which is impossible. J
I Lemma 5.5. There is no term t for which q  t :Σ(x :N) IsZero (fq x).
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Proof. Assume q  t : Σ(x : N) IsZero (fq x) for some t. We then have q  t.1 : N and
q  t.2 : IsZero (fq t.1). By Lemma 3.23 one has a partition q C q1, . . . , qn where for each i,
t.1⇒∗qi mi for some mi ∈ N. Hence qi ` IsZero (fq t.1)⇒∗ IsZero (fqmi) . But any partition
of q contain a condition, say qj , where qj(k) = 1 whenever k /∈ dom(q) and k ∈ dom(qj).
Assume mj ∈ dom(qj). If mj ∈ dom(q) then qj ` fqmj ⇒ 1 : N2 and if mj /∈ dom(q)
then qj ` fqmj ⇒ qj(k) := 1 : N2. Thus qj ` IsZero (fq t.1) ⇒∗ N0 and by Lemma 4.1,
qj  IsZero (f t.1) = N0. From  t.2 : IsZero (f t.1) by monotonicity and Lemma 3.24 we
have qj  t.2 : N0 which is impossible. If on the other hand mj /∈ dom(qj) then since
qj C qj(mj , 0), qj(mj , 1) we can apply the above argument with qj(mj , 1) instead of qj . J
I Lemma 5.6.  mw :¬MP
Proof. Assume p  t :MP for some p and t. Thus whenever q 6 p and q  u :N → N2 then
q  t u :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (ux)) → (Σ(x :N) IsZero (ux)). But we have q  fq :N → N2
by Lemma 5.3. Hence q  t fq : ¬¬(Σ(x : N)IsZero (fq x)) → (Σ(x : N)IsZero (fq x)). But
q  wq : ¬¬(Σ(x :N)IsZero (fq x)) by Lemma 5.4. Thus q  (t fq)wq : Σ(x :N) IsZero (fq x)
which is impossible by Lemma 5.5. J
We have then the following result.
I Theorem 5.7. There is a consistent extension of MLTT where ¬MP is derivable.
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